Archives for 2009

We wanted to share a couple of observations about the American ‘elite’s’ Afghanistan discussions. Perhaps you’ve noticed these things, too. What follows is a little bit idiosyncratic diagnosis and very much wishful thinking. Have no worries, though, the Stiftung is not going wobbly on you.

First, it’s disappointing to see how explicit analytical intellectual structure is so skeletal and perhaps non-existent in some cases. It’s true for many of the assessments, ‘debates’ or pronouncements we’ve seen. Beyond the expected sloppy Neocon stuff. Celebrated academics and self-professed ‘realists’ are doing the same. Second, despite talking non-stop about ‘Afghanistan’, it’s rarely the actual subject. As you’ve probably noticed it’s a notional stand in for revisiting other things, mostly the past — Bush/Cheney, the Surge, Saigon, etc.

We thought you might enjoy the dust jacket of the Bunker’s copy of Kent’s classic. (Yes, the hard cover was $3.00 – it’s a second printing). The book always represented more than the sum of its words. It once was and very dimly still is an ethos. Long time readers know our melody run on that one. Juxtapose it with the two observations above.

Policy is a contact sport, of course. People participate with various interests, training or intent. And who can expect — or wants — to hear a full blown six or seven step process while dodging interns in Dirksen hallways.

Yet in more formal environments such as testimony, panels, lunches or a daily afternoon roundtable one can and should expect more. (Doubtless someone has already Twitted in 140 characters that the ‘Stiftung is a [insert contracted insult] LOLZZZ’).

How disappointing to see what should be America’s starting line up seemingly riff extemporaneously with such haphazard thinking on ‘Afghanistan’. These are our ‘international heavyweights’. In their defense, they probably know better than most that ‘nuance’ is death in America. Bold, bright words. Get the product placement in and out before the next cable news hard break. And have we not here given them a rationale? Said ourselves that no one reads all that stuff anyway?

Commercial necessity aside, it’s no excuse for sloppy thinking. The collective move away from formal intellectual structure also has outcome determinative consequences. The most obvious? Commingling discrete and very different issues into simultaneous and largely mutually exclusive conversations. We’ve watched this phenomenon scale from the large venue gigs to just two ‘policy pros’ talking. Literally oblivious that no communication happened/is happening.

A question this blog asked since day one has been ‘What is the nature and purpose of American Power in the world?’ It’s huge. The Neocons and ‘realists’ are still fighting over 2001-2008 using ‘Afghanistan’ as a proxy. Having heard the best that the Neocons and ‘realists’ can offer, we say with all sincerity they, like Cromwell’s Parliament, have sat too long. It’s also disconcerting to see the dead hand of the past weigh so heavily. People who grew up worried about CEPs, throw weights and the like are carrying too much legacy baggage. To them we say ‘You call today’s challenges for the 21st Century but those are empty words. They mask that you offer stale ideas through the same worn out filters of the past. At some point, retire, step aside or otherwise allow new human capital to emerge. To the people reading this thinking I am speaking about you, I am. Mentor. Find new talent. But have the courage to get out of the way.’

To the ‘realists’ we say it is not enough to be against AEI. When you spend all your energies knocking down Neocons you play on their home field. You ratify and acknowledge their memes as reality that must be changed. You must demonstrate you ‘get it’ by enrolling people in a positive international relations architecture that will secure America either a graceful trajectory or soft landing. This is the intellectual challenge at hand, not The Weekly Standard. It will pay immediate dividends. If you can articulate a modern role for America in the evolving new global system *then* what a ‘realist’ might say about how and why Afghanistan fits within that framework is compelling. *That’s* how you create a sustainable alternative policy foundation that can beat Neocon sloganeering. As an extra bonus, ‘realists’, this is also how you create an objective metric for explicit and concrete opportunity cost analysis. Structure is your friend. Trust us.

Billions in contracts, careers, promotions, institutional inertia and safety in status quo ensures the importance of exploring the history and applicability of counter-insurgency. This narrative for America 2009 should follow answering the first question above. Why? Because this policy (shoddy or not, politically sellable or not) only has meaning within an ends means context. Right now, this issue – as the Stiftung’s many recent posts demonstrate – is the poster child for random thinking. To assert casually that we ‘must’ do ‘this’ and it may last for 40 years is almost sociopathic in its disregard for lives, welfare and human dignity.

And finally, what to do with the real Afghanistan with all its complexities? We get to this question after the first two make the case for American engagement. Here again, some structure is critical to wise analysis. When we actually talk about reality on the ground, there are perhaps six if not more dimensions to that: ethnic*-linguistic cleavages, social structures (state vs society), religious ideologies, how the wars since 1978 shaped demographics and social mores, the geopolitical questions of Afghanistan, its neighbors, etc, and then finally the history of economic development and narco-economics since the 1980s. You may have others to add.

When development policy advocates chime in their voices now subtract rather than add to coherence primarily because policy entrepreneurs tend to focus on one or two dimensions (with one being usually the counter-insurgency). Prioritization is essential but again, explain the premises, data and then offer your hypothesis. As we surf the AFPAK meme wave we see almost no integrated analysis in this regard. Or even recognizing that it’s merely the beginning. One must be aware that a matrix of these priorities will never be static but their saliency may ebb and flow. How noteworthy that our American penchant for assuming that ferrin countries pose for snapshots and never move remains.

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*Ethnic here is shorthand for linguistic identifiers, regional differentiation, sectarian adoption, racial and tribal belonging/Identity.