G<\/b>reat artists know a truth about the road. Doing a one-off show is often harder than preparing a lengthy tour. True whether musically, theatrically or politically.<\/p>\n
One date demands as much rehearsal time and clarity as a tour. Far easier to wing things, hoping charisma’s momentum and spontaneity will carry the day. History’s landscape is littered with tattered reputations – from humbled musical legends to political candidates. <\/p>\n
War isn’t much different. Consider Tommy Franks’ war plan (albeit with OSD and OVP intrusions) 2002-2003. He cast aside pre-existing plans and comparatively winged it. He also abruptly retired in 2003 before mistakes became obvious. Wolfowitz’s last minute failure with Turkey to create a northern front makes the point. Conversely, American Pacific success 1942-45 famously built on significant amphibious warfare planning from the 1920s. <\/p>\n
Germany 1935-45 is the poster child. Germany lost the improvised war by starting it on September 1, 1939. Yet German conceptual and economic preparations for an eventual intercontinental war with the US were substantial. In the European context, Germany’s 1936-37 economic crisis spurred radicalization and thinking about a general war by 1943-45. Still, the Four Year Plan and industrial base began alignment in 1938 for the later ‘inevitable’ world war with the US. The Corporal’s improvisations within this vague overall strategic concept jump started events and doomed both.<\/p>\n
Led Zeppelin notoriously devoted an entire month in 2007 to rehearse one 2 hour London show. Decades of calamitously unrehearsed ‘re-unions’ demanded it. <\/p>\n
Putin’s war on Ukraine is an improvised gig. And Vladimir Putin is no Led Zeppelin. <\/p>\n
P<\/b>utin launched his attack on or about the night of February 22nd relying only on his closest advisors, meaning almost no one. Assurances from MFA\/MID and other senior government officials at the time otherwise meant nothing. He invaded Crimea based on a war plan dating back to the late 1990s to secure the Black Seas Fleet. We disagree with the suggestion that a 2013 speech on the characteristics of emerging war by the General Staff is a modern “Hossbach Memorandum”, proving Putin long planned a carefully considered war of aggression on Ukraine.<\/a> Such observations ignore the culture, nature and purpose of General Staff discussions. <\/p>\n <\/p>\n Putin’s war began as a ‘one night gig’, not a world tour. His emotional volatility and impulsiveness triggered his war. And control him still. <\/p>\n Maidan, Berkut’s rout, Yanukovich’s flight, and cascading Lenin statutes wounded his personal prestige. But Maidan’s an existential problem. Putin interprets spontaneity elsewhere as purposeful direction by others. Perversely, American general passivity re Ukraine post 2008, ceding lead role to the EU, merely compounded the Kremlin’s insistence that the US is an unseen, lurking controlling force – a Rumsfeldian “unknown unknown”. <\/p>\n Putin shares the Soviet\/Great Russian prejudice that Ukraine is an unstructured cultural and ethnic ecumenae. (“It’s not a country, George”).<\/a> Ukraine plays a key role in Putin’s expansive view of Russian geopolitical entitlement, first developed in 2004-07 and programmatically implemented on his return to power in 2012. <\/p>\n Putin greatly accelerated general re-armament. He also expanded Russian investments and control in media. The general time horizons for overall re-structuring targeted 2018 through 2025. <\/p>\n Tellingly, for Ukraine in 2014 Putin’s government took no real advance (even clandestine) measures specifically to prepare the Russian economy, social sphere or even military force posture. Putin reacted ad hoc to events. He also revealed prematurely Russian infowar\/mass media and special forces tactics. Russia’s confused, self-defeating response to even mild Western sanctions underscores the point. Much GRU success in Crimea simply is due to unopposed operations using extensive local Russian networks.<\/p>\n Like many improvisers, Putin started lucky. He gained Crimea without a shot. The history books can now say he expanded Russia, unlike Stolypin. For a narcissist this is non-trivial. His agitprop at home inoculates him against Maidan. Had he stopped there, March 2014, he paid no costs. Berlin, Paris and elsewhere “understood”. Granted, unarmed Ukrainians surrendering to Spetznaz in Crimea created a tragi-comical high school troupe re-enactment of a mini Koniggratz<\/a>. <\/p>\n An ideological win is a win. Look at Grenada. <\/p>\n P<\/b>utin’s mistake was to continue. Euphoria’s high. Even now he’s groping for a landing. Zigs and zags since March show he’s trying to assert authority over both Ukraine and Russian elements who sparked his worst instincts. The later seek to use Putin and ignite their own dreams of domestic radicalization. <\/p>\n Ukraine phase two after Crimea attempted a ‘spontaneous’ uprising across the country. We’ve detailed how it and subsequent escalations failed. Novorossiya ideologues supported by Russian special forces and mercenaries acted out racial, ahistorical and emotionally revanchist themes. Ukraine itself became a prop in a larger ideological agenda.<\/p>\n By May, Ukrainians clearly defeated Russia’s overall “hybrid war” bum rush. Almost all regions stayed loyal to Kiev. Yanukovich’s Party of the Regions largely stood with Kiev, rejecting Moscow. Even in the Donbass, the most lawless, pro-Russian, neo-Soviet region, Russians found little native support. <\/p>\n Putin suffered first public loss of personal control then. Russian Donbass fascist and orthodox activists with their Russian sponsors ignored his explicit public wishes. Soon they began to criticize Putin’s refusal to escalate more troops directly. Worse, these same Novorossiya ideologues not only caused international atrocities like MH17; they were losing despite Russian reinforcements.<\/p>\n For a while, Putin genuinely seemed sensitive to his fascist, nationalist Right, mentioning Novorossiya in March. Then Novorossiya idealogues’ continued public, personal disloyalty and failures forced his hand. They weren’t going to help him find answers but give him problems.<\/p>\n Putin instinctively turned to loyalists. On example is Surkov. Besides being a Kremlin cardinal of political manipulation, Surkov served as emissary to Ukraine. He vied with neo-fascist sympathizer ‘economist’ Glazyev. Glazyev, besides calling for destruction of the world dollar economy and Russian autarky, is connected to the well known nationalist\/neo-fascist Izborsk Club. Novorossiya ideologues rightly saw Surkov’s ascendancy on Ukrainian issues as their defeat.<\/p>\n Surkov gives Putin discretion, loyalty and cynical political savvy – he knows how to make deals. Putin personally assumed control of the VPK, replacing Rogozin as chief of the military industrial commission. (Putin’s direct role became essential and inevitable with sanctions. Political and economic tensions within the VPK and Ministry of Defense required his personal engagement as final arbiter anyway). <\/p>\n The Kremlin played up long simmering cracks in the ultra-nationalist\/fascist wedge, too. Well known Kirginyan, founder of the uber-nationalist “Essence of Time” movement (among the 20 plus neo-fascist groups in the Russian constellation), aggressively disagreed with National Unity, Dugin, Girkin\/Strelkov and a host of others over Novorossiya and the Donbass. The Kremlin gave his voice media coverage as a Putin cut out. <\/p>\n Putin canned a few senior and mid-level security officials (in part for particulars, in part to send a signal). The Power Ministries? Firmly his. He also rejected a major demand of the Novorossiya ideologues and neo-fascists. Since April they clamored for a larger domestic radicalization against so-called “Fifth Column” traitors who disagreed with war and escalation. Putin announced on national TV there would be no general purge of the so-called ‘Fifth Column’ (Russian fascists also identified sixth and seventh columns in the Kremlin, too, if you’re counting). Russian ideologues saw the writing on the wall.<\/p>\n By mid-Summer Putin still had no plan but the Kremlin faction seeking to jettison the Novorossiya project attended to specifics. First, Dugin was fired from his professor’s chair. His entire department at Moscow State University also purged of like-minded. Significantly, court jester Zhirinovsky took Dugin’s place in an exquisite demotion of Dugin twice over. Dugin blamed Surkov which is to say Putin. <\/p>\n Putin’s broom also swept the Donbass. Girkin and the whole Novorossiya lot recalled and now twist in a vague, quasi obscurity. The intended message? What happens in Donbass will be because the Kremlin made the call, not idle orthodox radical oligarchs, an odd club and hired atavistic re-enactors. Putin’s replacements included an Old Guard from 1991 Soviet crackdowns and later Moldova’s frozen conflict. Will Putin’s deck clearing work? The jury’s still out. (With overt Russian military in the Donbass, Putin trimmed freelancing but also increased direct responsibility). <\/p>\n By August, Putin settled for protracted negotiations over Donbass. His signal to the West? He staged an an elaborate August event from Yalta in Crimea. Appearing before his government and international journalists, Putin veered far off standard Russian cant and declared Russia desired a unitary Ukraine, an independent country, a cease fire and federalization. These words are spikes through the heart of the Novorossiya ideological project. <\/p>\n Zhirinovsky specifically was assigned to sit on stage with Putin, playing again in the assigned court jester role. He trotted out all of the fascist Novorossiya arguments comically, only to be cut off. Putin rolled his eyes in front of all several times before rejecting the Novorossiya ideology as merely Zhironovsky’s personal passion. Putin underscored those views are not official Russian state policy. <\/p>\n Naturally, Putin can’t and doesn’t allow this to be televised at home. Its audience was abroad. <\/p>\n P<\/b>utin’s face saving included humanitarian hero. The Kremlin typically surveys Russians more extensively than an American presidential campaign. Putin knows Russians don’t support a war with casualties (Cargo 200) from Ukraine. He tried to stage an initial humanitarian Potemkin Convoy for Russian TV. Was it a workable plan? Putin forgot Ukraine and the international community wanted a vote. Putin’s intended PR victory lap became an embarrassment. The convoy sat idle, mired in delays, the trucks exposed as empty.<\/p>\n We said at the time the convoy’s mission was: (1) PR optics for Russian domestic politics; (2) exfiltration of men, casualties, equipment & evidence; and (3) a replay of Germany post May 1945 re seizure of capital plant. A little of all occurred, but Putin’s improvised hero moment fizzled out. <\/p>\n Denied a hero role, Putin in sullen mood then went to Minsk in August to meet Ukraine’s Poroshenko, Lukashenko (Belarus) and Nazarbayev (Kazakhstan).<\/a> It was an inauspicious day. <\/p>\n Putin offended the other presidents from his own micro Customs Union. Already high tensions only grew. Poroshenko then forgot Vladimir Putin’s personal truth: everything is personal. Unfortunately, Poroshenko and the Ukrainians were perceived as acting as though the ATO already secured victory. Russians claimed to be annoyed by Ukrainians’ alleged difficulties clarifying if a bilateral Putin-Poroshenko meeting would occur and when. When the two met, a bad day got worse. Poroshenko left to the Ukrainian embassy to give an address, blowing off a planned wrap up session with all four presidents. Ukrainians spun the day as a success; the Russians hinted Putin took it all as a series of personal slights.<\/p>\n The next day the Russian army overtly entered Donbass in moderate force without pretension. They assaulted Ukrainian volunteers exposed and unsupported by the Ukrainian military. Luhansk fell. Poroshenko finally saw the difference between an ATO and a focused military campaign. On TV Poroshenko claimed 60% of forward-deployed Ukrainian military equipment was destroyed. For domestic reasons, Putin slapped the Novorossiya label on the now stronger Russian Donbass position. The title gave a sop to sidelined Russian ideologues; Putin now claimed Novorossiya for himself.<\/p>\n Many in the West misunderstood Putin’s move post-Minsk. Tactical escalation didn’t herald an imminent, wider offensive into Ukraine. (Mariupol was the first clue). Putin undermined his own clumsy PR, boasting he could take Kiev in 2 weeks. As with most Putin self-puffery, it rings hollow. The Russian army fully mobilized would be pressed even against overmatched Ukrainian defenses. Of all peoples, the Russians should know taking something and holding it are worlds apart. The occupation would be a nightmare.<\/p>\n We’re essentially back at Yalta. Putin called Poroshenko’s ATO bluff and raised the ceasefire ante. Putin flirts with dangling a unitary Ukraine hobbled with pro-Russian federalization (Kiev rightly wants the much different de-centralization). Kiev controls far less of the Donbass than before Minsk and suffered casualties. Kiev must focus on the economy, which teeters, and decline provocations. Ukraine’s capacity to function as a society must come first. Sustaining that beyond short term loans will require deep reform and anti-corruption. <\/p>\n Western will be vital, including less glamorous things like advising on General Staff reform and C3 issues. Ukraine’s westward story will be told in years, not months. Kiev should be realistic about non-political options for changing ground truth immediately. Weapons alone won’t be the answer.<\/p>\n W<\/b>ill Putin settle for a frozen conflict now? Unlikely. Improvisers like Putin generally don’t know when to stop. The gamble is the next hole card an ace. Putin, however, needs a (temporary) truce as much as Poroshenko.<\/p>\n Putin will remain tactically opportunist. His position, allegiances and personnel can change for clear, short term gain. Ukraine should focus its priorities – on reform, economic progress and anti-corruption. That Ukraine, simply by existing, rebukes and threatens Putinism.<\/p>\n Putin’s still emotionally volatile. Following the Minsk Summit, he went out of his way to question his erstwhile ally Kazakstan’s sovereignty and national viability. The sizable number of Russian speakers there make a threat of another Ukraine resonate. The Baltic allies, too, see Russian provocations. Russian planes perform intrusive stunts from Alaska to Finland.<\/p>\n The good news? Putin’s overt war on Ukraine was and remains to date a largely unsuccessful one-off improv. The costs are still mounting. Western sanctions disappointed many but ample signs of impact are real. Raiding rival oligarchs for cash and assets already beginning.<\/a> Capital outflow continues at staggering levels<\/a> – $3,805 every second. The sober view? Putin’s larger quest to upend the Western order and undermine perceived American influence will continue in different guises, if not expand. <\/p>\n Ukraine withstood irrational, nihilist violence, propaganda and concentrated subversion. Putin’s so-called “hybrid war” to gain all or most of Ukraine on the roll failed. Ukrainian newborn nationalism fought Russia almost to a standstill in the most pro-Russian region outside Russia itself. All despite Ukrainian treason, local oligarch duplicity and surprise. Putin may spin his mess in Donbass as a win. He’ll certainly keeping looking for the next hole card.<\/p>\n Kiev’s commitment to the West means Putin and Russia lost the real prize. That’s encouraging to all supporters of freedom along the periphery. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Preparing Is Hard Work Great artists know a truth about the road. Doing a one-off show is often harder than preparing a lengthy tour. True whether musically, theatrically or politically. One date demands as much rehearsal time and clarity as a tour. Far easier to wing things, hoping charisma’s momentum and spontaneity will carry the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"om_disable_all_campaigns":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_active":false,"_monsterinsights_sitenote_note":"","_monsterinsights_sitenote_category":0,"_genesis_hide_title":false,"_genesis_hide_breadcrumbs":false,"_genesis_hide_singular_image":false,"_genesis_hide_footer_widgets":false,"_genesis_custom_body_class":"","_genesis_custom_post_class":"","_genesis_layout":"","two_page_speed":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[26,12,16],"tags":[259,116,96,97,213],"class_list":{"0":"post-8653","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","6":"category-defense","7":"category-foreign-policy","8":"category-change-baby","9":"tag-foreign-policy","10":"tag-nato","11":"tag-putin","12":"tag-russia","13":"tag-ukraine","14":"entry"},"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.stiftungleostrauss.com\/bunker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8653","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.stiftungleostrauss.com\/bunker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.stiftungleostrauss.com\/bunker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.stiftungleostrauss.com\/bunker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.stiftungleostrauss.com\/bunker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=8653"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"http:\/\/www.stiftungleostrauss.com\/bunker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/8653\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/www.stiftungleostrauss.com\/bunker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=8653"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.stiftungleostrauss.com\/bunker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=8653"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/www.stiftungleostrauss.com\/bunker\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=8653"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![\"Putin,](\"http:\/\/www.stiftungleostrauss.com\/bunker\/wp-content\/uploads\/2014\/09\/If_Russia_Were_A_Rock_Band.png\")
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