What to make of the partial withdrawal? Putin’s a tactical thinker, not a strategist. His decisions often are delayed and impulsive – as clear throughout 2014-15. Interestingly, Tehran was as surprised as everyone else – including the Russian Ministry of Defense.
Russia accomplished readily achievable goals with its limited resources. Moscow strengthened Assad (or an Alawite successor) as we noted would happen in September. Long standing Russian bases in Western Syria will not be overrun now. Strategically, however, the actual controlled ground among the various fighting groups and Assad hasn’t changed significantly. (Professional Western pessimists’ claim Russia always planned to conquer all of Syria with Iran never analytically serious).
The limited, quick intervention in Syria and then partial withdrawal is perhaps the closest Moscow has come to using its military as it was designed after its calamitous 2008 performance against Georgia – even if accidentally. Syria, not the chimera of massed Soviet-style offensives across Ukraine to Poland, represents the example of the Serdykov (former Minister of Defense) modernization. (In Russian parlance, modernization is now a disfavored term – the new expression is ‘increasing national potential’). The Russian military is becoming optimized more for quick operational fighting around the Russian periphery, not protracted occupations or campaigns in Eastern Europe.
Not everything went Putin’s way. To overcome initial failed Syrian offensives, Russia committed limited ground troops into actual combat and escalated air strikes. Putin’s speech and award of medals confirms their role. The Western-backed Free Syria Army bore the brunt of Russian attacks, ISIS almost none at all. After that, what were Moscow’s realistic military options? Not much. And real and potential costs continued to grow.
At the macro strategic level, Russia’s military gambit failed to create the always unrealistic Grand Bargain with Washington/Europe – Moscow’s coveted Yalta 2.0. Sanctions over Ukraine remain. Washington’s grudging acceptance of a Russian role in Syria is not the same. In Syria itself, uncontrollable risks grew as set forth in the preceding post, ranging from Turkish hostility/regional ambitions, Saudi/Sunni rage (delivered MANPADs as well as threatened troops), Iranian agendas, blowback inside Russia and growing domestic Russian economic crisis. Worse for Moscow, China challenges Russian security influence in Tajikistan and across Central Asian (often ignored by the West).
Of the 15 aircraft pulled so far, about half the limited numbers, are mainly SU-24s and SU-25s: a bomber and ground attack platform. Those would be needed to support future ground operations. While Putin claims he could re-introduce forces to Syria, it would not be as easy this time. Syrian Opposition MANPADs greatly complicate future plans. The remaining fighter force in Syria? More than sufficient to complicate a no-fly zone, deter others and gain time to re-assess within strategic constraints.
Claims circulate in Russia the last few days that the Syrian gambit cost Moscow far more than Putin’s stated price of $480 million. The Russian defense budget going forward is already under massive pressure.
The questions still are many. Is it too soon to call Russia’s efforts Pyrrhic? Syria after 2011 remains true today: watch this space.
Dr Leo Strauss says
Putin, Patrushev and Ivanov decided to pull out the strike package and troops without achieving their broader goals. Russia did solidify Assad but lacked the resources (and strategic desire) to do more; hence the surprise to Tehran and leaving Assad abruptly. Putin decided not to get drawn into a wider quagmire outside his control.
We both agree Russian assets in place are sufficient to deter a NFZ without Putin’s approval. The West and Turkey eschewed a NFZ for over 4 years, making it more precautionary.
Putin could always re-introduce forces but the regime’s domestic political costs would be non-trivial.
Alex says
Tactically, while their air and their SAMs are present, there can’t be a NFZ unless either they consent to it, or we’re willing to risk war with Russia. Similarly, Western (or any other) air operations are constrained by a) the counterair threat but more importantly by b) the necessity of deconfliction. If you have to deconflict the daily ATO (not the Ukrainian kind, the other kind, but the other kind is an anti-terrorist operation…so confusing:-))with someone, that someone has a veto over your operations (and of course full insight into targeting).
Operationally, this meant a rapid power projection into Syria which they exploited to improve Assad’s position on the ground.
Strategically, this means they have a veto over most kinds of coercive action against Assad (or conceivably any other actor in Syria they find it expedient to protect), and scenarios in which he falls without an international intervention have been pushed back by joint land-air action. In that sense, establishing some IADS coverage there essentially lets them provide extended-deterrence. As far as anyone knows (and Bellingcat will surely tell us as soon as the next lot of commercial satellite imagery shows up), the TELARs are still there, and of course the aircraft could deploy back at any time.
That they’ve done their thing, declared victory, and got out will tend to validate them in this strategic raiding mode (kind of Gwyn Prins or UK SDRs passim, also reminiscent of the French down to Mali). It’s a dear do, though, power projection…