Great artists know a truth about the road. Doing a one-off show is often harder than preparing a lengthy tour. True whether musically, theatrically or politically.
One date demands as much rehearsal time and clarity as a tour. Far easier to wing things, hoping charisma’s momentum and spontaneity will carry the day. History’s landscape is littered with tattered reputations – from humbled musical legends to political candidates.
War isn’t much different. Consider Tommy Franks’ war plan (albeit with OSD and OVP intrusions) 2002-2003. He cast aside pre-existing plans and comparatively winged it. He also abruptly retired in 2003 before mistakes became obvious. Wolfowitz’s last minute failure with Turkey to create a northern front makes the point. Conversely, American Pacific success 1942-45 famously built on significant amphibious warfare planning from the 1920s.
Germany 1935-45 is the poster child. Germany lost the improvised war by starting it on September 1, 1939. Yet German conceptual and economic preparations for an eventual intercontinental war with the US were substantial. In the European context, Germany’s 1936-37 economic crisis spurred radicalization and thinking about a general war by 1943-45. Still, the Four Year Plan and industrial base began alignment in 1938 for the later ‘inevitable’ world war with the US. The Corporal’s improvisations within this vague overall strategic concept jump started events and doomed both.
Led Zeppelin notoriously devoted an entire month in 2007 to rehearse one 2 hour London show. Decades of calamitously unrehearsed ‘re-unions’ demanded it.
Putin’s war on Ukraine is an improvised gig. And Vladimir Putin is no Led Zeppelin.
Putin launched his attack on or about the night of February 22nd relying only on his closest advisors, meaning almost no one. Assurances from MFA/MID and other senior government officials at the time otherwise meant nothing. He invaded Crimea based on a war plan dating back to the late 1990s to secure the Black Seas Fleet. We disagree with the suggestion that a 2013 speech on the characteristics of emerging war by the General Staff is a modern “Hossbach Memorandum”, proving Putin long planned a carefully considered war of aggression on Ukraine. Such observations ignore the culture, nature and purpose of General Staff discussions.
Putin’s war began as a ‘one night gig’, not a world tour. His emotional volatility and impulsiveness triggered his war. And control him still.
Maidan, Berkut’s rout, Yanukovich’s flight, and cascading Lenin statutes wounded his personal prestige. But Maidan’s an existential problem. Putin interprets spontaneity elsewhere as purposeful direction by others. Perversely, American general passivity re Ukraine post 2008, ceding lead role to the EU, merely compounded the Kremlin’s insistence that the US is an unseen, lurking controlling force – a Rumsfeldian “unknown unknown”.
Putin shares the Soviet/Great Russian prejudice that Ukraine is an unstructured cultural and ethnic ecumenae. (“It’s not a country, George”). Ukraine plays a key role in Putin’s expansive view of Russian geopolitical entitlement, first developed in 2004-07 and programmatically implemented on his return to power in 2012.
Putin greatly accelerated general re-armament. He also expanded Russian investments and control in media. The general time horizons for overall re-structuring targeted 2018 through 2025.
Tellingly, for Ukraine in 2014 Putin’s government took no real advance (even clandestine) measures specifically to prepare the Russian economy, social sphere or even military force posture. Putin reacted ad hoc to events. He also revealed prematurely Russian infowar/mass media and special forces tactics. Russia’s confused, self-defeating response to even mild Western sanctions underscores the point. Much GRU success in Crimea simply is due to unopposed operations using extensive local Russian networks.
Like many improvisers, Putin started lucky. He gained Crimea without a shot. The history books can now say he expanded Russia, unlike Stolypin. For a narcissist this is non-trivial. His agitprop at home inoculates him against Maidan. Had he stopped there, March 2014, he paid no costs. Berlin, Paris and elsewhere “understood”. Granted, unarmed Ukrainians surrendering to Spetznaz in Crimea created a tragi-comical high school troupe re-enactment of a mini Koniggratz.
An ideological win is a win. Look at Grenada.
Putin’s mistake was to continue. Euphoria’s high. Even now he’s groping for a landing. Zigs and zags since March show he’s trying to assert authority over both Ukraine and Russian elements who sparked his worst instincts. The later seek to use Putin and ignite their own dreams of domestic radicalization.
Ukraine phase two after Crimea attempted a ‘spontaneous’ uprising across the country. We’ve detailed how it and subsequent escalations failed. Novorossiya ideologues supported by Russian special forces and mercenaries acted out racial, ahistorical and emotionally revanchist themes. Ukraine itself became a prop in a larger ideological agenda.
By May, Ukrainians clearly defeated Russia’s overall “hybrid war” bum rush. Almost all regions stayed loyal to Kiev. Yanukovich’s Party of the Regions largely stood with Kiev, rejecting Moscow. Even in the Donbass, the most lawless, pro-Russian, neo-Soviet region, Russians found little native support.
Putin suffered first public loss of personal control then. Russian Donbass fascist and orthodox activists with their Russian sponsors ignored his explicit public wishes. Soon they began to criticize Putin’s refusal to escalate more troops directly. Worse, these same Novorossiya ideologues not only caused international atrocities like MH17; they were losing despite Russian reinforcements.
For a while, Putin genuinely seemed sensitive to his fascist, nationalist Right, mentioning Novorossiya in March. Then Novorossiya idealogues’ continued public, personal disloyalty and failures forced his hand. They weren’t going to help him find answers but give him problems.
Putin instinctively turned to loyalists. On example is Surkov. Besides being a Kremlin cardinal of political manipulation, Surkov served as emissary to Ukraine. He vied with neo-fascist sympathizer ‘economist’ Glazyev. Glazyev, besides calling for destruction of the world dollar economy and Russian autarky, is connected to the well known nationalist/neo-fascist Izborsk Club. Novorossiya ideologues rightly saw Surkov’s ascendancy on Ukrainian issues as their defeat.
Surkov gives Putin discretion, loyalty and cynical political savvy – he knows how to make deals. Putin personally assumed control of the VPK, replacing Rogozin as chief of the military industrial commission. (Putin’s direct role became essential and inevitable with sanctions. Political and economic tensions within the VPK and Ministry of Defense required his personal engagement as final arbiter anyway).
The Kremlin played up long simmering cracks in the ultra-nationalist/fascist wedge, too. Well known Kirginyan, founder of the uber-nationalist “Essence of Time” movement (among the 20 plus neo-fascist groups in the Russian constellation), aggressively disagreed with National Unity, Dugin, Girkin/Strelkov and a host of others over Novorossiya and the Donbass. The Kremlin gave his voice media coverage as a Putin cut out.
Putin canned a few senior and mid-level security officials (in part for particulars, in part to send a signal). The Power Ministries? Firmly his. He also rejected a major demand of the Novorossiya ideologues and neo-fascists. Since April they clamored for a larger domestic radicalization against so-called “Fifth Column” traitors who disagreed with war and escalation. Putin announced on national TV there would be no general purge of the so-called ‘Fifth Column’ (Russian fascists also identified sixth and seventh columns in the Kremlin, too, if you’re counting). Russian ideologues saw the writing on the wall.
By mid-Summer Putin still had no plan but the Kremlin faction seeking to jettison the Novorossiya project attended to specifics. First, Dugin was fired from his professor’s chair. His entire department at Moscow State University also purged of like-minded. Significantly, court jester Zhirinovsky took Dugin’s place in an exquisite demotion of Dugin twice over. Dugin blamed Surkov which is to say Putin.
Putin’s broom also swept the Donbass. Girkin and the whole Novorossiya lot recalled and now twist in a vague, quasi obscurity. The intended message? What happens in Donbass will be because the Kremlin made the call, not idle orthodox radical oligarchs, an odd club and hired atavistic re-enactors. Putin’s replacements included an Old Guard from 1991 Soviet crackdowns and later Moldova’s frozen conflict. Will Putin’s deck clearing work? The jury’s still out. (With overt Russian military in the Donbass, Putin trimmed freelancing but also increased direct responsibility).
By August, Putin settled for protracted negotiations over Donbass. His signal to the West? He staged an an elaborate August event from Yalta in Crimea. Appearing before his government and international journalists, Putin veered far off standard Russian cant and declared Russia desired a unitary Ukraine, an independent country, a cease fire and federalization. These words are spikes through the heart of the Novorossiya ideological project.
Zhirinovsky specifically was assigned to sit on stage with Putin, playing again in the assigned court jester role. He trotted out all of the fascist Novorossiya arguments comically, only to be cut off. Putin rolled his eyes in front of all several times before rejecting the Novorossiya ideology as merely Zhironovsky’s personal passion. Putin underscored those views are not official Russian state policy.
Naturally, Putin can’t and doesn’t allow this to be televised at home. Its audience was abroad.
Putin’s face saving included humanitarian hero. The Kremlin typically surveys Russians more extensively than an American presidential campaign. Putin knows Russians don’t support a war with casualties (Cargo 200) from Ukraine. He tried to stage an initial humanitarian Potemkin Convoy for Russian TV. Was it a workable plan? Putin forgot Ukraine and the international community wanted a vote. Putin’s intended PR victory lap became an embarrassment. The convoy sat idle, mired in delays, the trucks exposed as empty.
We said at the time the convoy’s mission was: (1) PR optics for Russian domestic politics; (2) exfiltration of men, casualties, equipment & evidence; and (3) a replay of Germany post May 1945 re seizure of capital plant. A little of all occurred, but Putin’s improvised hero moment fizzled out.
Denied a hero role, Putin in sullen mood then went to Minsk in August to meet Ukraine’s Poroshenko, Lukashenko (Belarus) and Nazarbayev (Kazakhstan). It was an inauspicious day.
Putin offended the other presidents from his own micro Customs Union. Already high tensions only grew. Poroshenko then forgot Vladimir Putin’s personal truth: everything is personal. Unfortunately, Poroshenko and the Ukrainians were perceived as acting as though the ATO already secured victory. Russians claimed to be annoyed by Ukrainians’ alleged difficulties clarifying if a bilateral Putin-Poroshenko meeting would occur and when. When the two met, a bad day got worse. Poroshenko left to the Ukrainian embassy to give an address, blowing off a planned wrap up session with all four presidents. Ukrainians spun the day as a success; the Russians hinted Putin took it all as a series of personal slights.
The next day the Russian army overtly entered Donbass in moderate force without pretension. They assaulted Ukrainian volunteers exposed and unsupported by the Ukrainian military. Luhansk fell. Poroshenko finally saw the difference between an ATO and a focused military campaign. On TV Poroshenko claimed 60% of forward-deployed Ukrainian military equipment was destroyed. For domestic reasons, Putin slapped the Novorossiya label on the now stronger Russian Donbass position. The title gave a sop to sidelined Russian ideologues; Putin now claimed Novorossiya for himself.
Many in the West misunderstood Putin’s move post-Minsk. Tactical escalation didn’t herald an imminent, wider offensive into Ukraine. (Mariupol was the first clue). Putin undermined his own clumsy PR, boasting he could take Kiev in 2 weeks. As with most Putin self-puffery, it rings hollow. The Russian army fully mobilized would be pressed even against overmatched Ukrainian defenses. Of all peoples, the Russians should know taking something and holding it are worlds apart. The occupation would be a nightmare.
We’re essentially back at Yalta. Putin called Poroshenko’s ATO bluff and raised the ceasefire ante. Putin flirts with dangling a unitary Ukraine hobbled with pro-Russian federalization (Kiev rightly wants the much different de-centralization). Kiev controls far less of the Donbass than before Minsk and suffered casualties. Kiev must focus on the economy, which teeters, and decline provocations. Ukraine’s capacity to function as a society must come first. Sustaining that beyond short term loans will require deep reform and anti-corruption.
Western will be vital, including less glamorous things like advising on General Staff reform and C3 issues. Ukraine’s westward story will be told in years, not months. Kiev should be realistic about non-political options for changing ground truth immediately. Weapons alone won’t be the answer.
Will Putin settle for a frozen conflict now? Unlikely. Improvisers like Putin generally don’t know when to stop. The gamble is the next hole card an ace. Putin, however, needs a (temporary) truce as much as Poroshenko.
Putin will remain tactically opportunist. His position, allegiances and personnel can change for clear, short term gain. Ukraine should focus its priorities – on reform, economic progress and anti-corruption. That Ukraine, simply by existing, rebukes and threatens Putinism.
Putin’s still emotionally volatile. Following the Minsk Summit, he went out of his way to question his erstwhile ally Kazakstan’s sovereignty and national viability. The sizable number of Russian speakers there make a threat of another Ukraine resonate. The Baltic allies, too, see Russian provocations. Russian planes perform intrusive stunts from Alaska to Finland.
The good news? Putin’s overt war on Ukraine was and remains to date a largely unsuccessful one-off improv. The costs are still mounting. Western sanctions disappointed many but ample signs of impact are real. Raiding rival oligarchs for cash and assets already beginning. Capital outflow continues at staggering levels – $3,805 every second. The sober view? Putin’s larger quest to upend the Western order and undermine perceived American influence will continue in different guises, if not expand.
Ukraine withstood irrational, nihilist violence, propaganda and concentrated subversion. Putin’s so-called “hybrid war” to gain all or most of Ukraine on the roll failed. Ukrainian newborn nationalism fought Russia almost to a standstill in the most pro-Russian region outside Russia itself. All despite Ukrainian treason, local oligarch duplicity and surprise. Putin may spin his mess in Donbass as a win. He’ll certainly keeping looking for the next hole card.
Kiev’s commitment to the West means Putin and Russia lost the real prize. That’s encouraging to all supporters of freedom along the periphery.
Aldershot says
Coincidentally, I went to Window on Eurasia and found this article posted today:
“…„Unpredictability,” the Lithuanian poet says, works to Putin’s benefit, but only if outsiders accept it as genuine rather than an act. Once they recognize that he is using it as a tactic, they can take action in response to him. If they do, then as ugly as the current situation appears to be, „everything will end well.”
According to Venclova, the three Baltic countries are within Putin’s sights, but they are not equally targets. Lithuania has only a few percent of ethnic Russians while Latvia and Estonia have many more. What the latter must do, Venclova says, is continue to „integrate rather than isolate” those communities. Then, they won’t look to Putin.
Venclova said that „if Putin bombed Vilnius, [he] would die on the spot or take up arms to kill. Life would no longer have any meaning for [him].” But he doesn’t expect that to happen because „Putin in the depths of his soul is a cowardly Leningrad hooligan who won’t do that because he knows that as a result, he would die … and lose his money.”
Moreover, he continues, Putin is surrounded by people who may owe their wealth to the Kremlin dictator but who are not fundamentally irrational either. Many of them,Venclova says, are „probably” thinking already that „Putin has gotten into a blind alley,” and they must „do something about it.”
That explains, the poet says, „why Putin is so afraid of poisoning or other misfortunes.” In some respects, the current situation recalls that of the reign of Tsar Paul, who appeared to become „so crazy that he was eventually killed by those around him [when] they no longer could put up with” the results of his statements and actions.”
http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/10/window-on-eurasia-putin-feigns-madness.html
DrLeoStrauss says
Agree in general with the quoted item. Putin’s currently provoking the periphery to mask his mistakes in Ukraine, buy time and retain a facade of bluster/fear. Obama in Estonia put the full prestige and commitment of the US & Article 5 in the Baltics; Putin is not a suicide. But he knows how to play on fears.
Unfortunately, many in the West are full time “Putin Is Coming” threat traffickers 24/7. Others are in countries nearby. It’s a time honored client state practice to seek re-assurance from their Metropole.
American emotional vandals have no such excuse. Pumping cries of ‘wolf’ every day about any possible rumor without context or considered analysis into the social media noise perversely mirrors Russia Today and Russian state sponsored propoganda. Facts and context just hinder the higher ’cause’. Many know the difference between advocacy and analysis. They don’t care. Their goal is hyper emotionalism and ‘moral clarity’.
Paul Goble hosts that site you cited. He’s an experienced former government hand. He functions as a sort of human FBIS and translates a few articles daily adding a sentence or two with commentary. Goble knows this is not analysis. What he chooses to translate does impact agendas given how few Americans and DC policy makers speak Russian.
Unfortunately, another site, funded by Yukos refugees (met them, they’re nice) mirrors Goble’s few daily excerpts verbatim. They add the mirror alongside their own daily dose of sensationalism and rumors, seeking to burnish their perception with a substantive veneer. Even so, that entire second site often is a missed opportunity, although they do some good pure translation work.
With the potential money available (the admin part works out of a monied DC law firm but the Yukos folks are more NY based) that site could have been a unique, powerful strategic resource. There is a compelling need for both immediate, tactical info-war purposes and a broader, substantive time urgent strategic perspective in English.
Back to the topic – there’re few signs now Russia is prepared for or anticpating another venture on the Ukraine scale. Beyond the small ball theater of relatively low cost provocations, threats, etc. The regime’s allergy to admitting casualties clear. Her internal politics are fragmenting, the economy teetering. Most importantly, Russia must figure out why their tactics and strategy failed, requiring overt military invasion – and against NATO that’s an existential gambit.
Should some unforseen personal slight or blow to prestige occur, one should naturally re-examine matters, especially for non-NATO states like Kazakhstan. (Putin tried to mend fences there post Minsk).
After the post was written, Putin continued his course, replacing some just newly appointed Donbass personnel linked to Moldova’s Frozen Conflict. He also rejected the neo-fascist calls to militarize and mobilize the economy for autarky, impose travel limits and currency controls. Main Russian State TV no longer calls Kiev a junta and changed other language as well.
Interestingly, a famous ultranationalist website (sputnik and pogrom) long in alliance with Dugin/extreme fascists and critical of Putin for his weak moderation is now under FSB investigation for possible encitement of ethnic hatred (rich, right?). (Their crime was lack of loyalty, of course).
Putin still plays to win in Ukraine, seeking subordination. Yet he also yearns to escape his trap and find a way somehow to re-emerge as globally relevant again. Could he do something stupid and test the Baltics? Sure. But we judge the odds low as of this writing.
His obsession all along really is about escaping ‘American oppression’ in the broader international order. Ukraine was an overly expensive pit stop. He hopes.
Aldershot says
“Most importantly, Russia must figure out why their tactics and strategy failed, requiring overt military invasion…”
It seems obvious to me that even the separatist region has been there, done that as far as being in the Russian fold:
http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/10/window-on-eurasia-21-ways-life-in.html
Then again, how much of the above should be taken with a grain of salt, since Window takes sides in the info war?
Over all, Putin achieved an important goal in drawing, yet again, a line in the sand. (I still question the amount of culpability Mrs. Kagan, et al., hold.)
Aldershot says
Intriguing analysis, Doc. I would be interested to know your general personality/psychological assessment of Putin. I assume he was a good KGB agent, which would have required discretion and self-control. The Dugin-types he dealt with out of necessity and to further his aims seemed masterfully done. I assume any noises he is making about the Baltic states are to draw attention to the fact he will not be toyed with.
DrLeoStrauss says
A number of people have written on Putin’s entry into the KGB after Andropov decided on creating new entrance requirements to widen the range of applicants (for political reasons). And there’s much speculation what it meant to be stationed as a Lt. Col. in the Dresden backwater during the height of the Cold War contra Bonn, Paris, NY or Moscow. His year stint as FSB Chair for Yeltsin may have erased any sense of marginalization, although that post was more about internal Kremlin politics than any of Putin’s substantive intelligence or security achievements.
My own take? His exposure to Sobchak in Vladgrad and later his elevation by Berezovsky to Moscow and immediate immersion in court intrigue around Yeltsin and the Family had as much if not more impact on his operational concept of purposeful politics. People frequently compare the early Putin years with the Eisenstein movie Ivan Pt 1 (surrounded by Boyars who wanted to use Ivan as a puppet) and his resort to the siloviki as structurally foreseable if not inevitable.
His isolation now, institutionally, interpersonally, and emotionally perhaps deserves a separate post. What do you think?
Aldershot says
I think you read my mind.
DrLeoStrauss says
Fair points all. Agree Ukraine’s protracted conflict will not be resolved soon, easily or without further escalations. Yet, it’s important to keep in perspective what Putin’s managed to achieve. Especially given Russians’ amorphously ambitious aspirations for taking the whole of Ukraine on the run in March-May 2014.
Putin’s “hybrid war” failed. Russia secured her now limited goals in the Donbass only by finally using overt, formal military force. Absent that, Ukraine’s extremely uneven ATO was still on the cusp of storming Donetsk and closing the pocket. Russia failed to secure the single most Russia-friendly region outside Russia herself (except London, perhaps) without the Russian Army. (And Putin quickly withdrew much of the limited military presence, not just for optics but because he lacks durable domestic support for overt, sustained war and casualties in Ukraine now).
Who prevails during the interregnum is unclear. Too few Ukrainians (and Western emotional arsonists) understand that true Western support is the possibly $40 billion financial and economic lifeline – rather than a truckload of TOW missiles. Poroshenko and company haven’t enrolled Ukraine in what constitutes winning by reform and survival. Do they have time to develop the necessary political skills?
The American Right (and rootless status quo policy entrepreneurs) are obsessed with the false veneer of precision. GPS is definitely a dog whistle – both situationally and re the Tom Tom/smartphone/Audi Connect verbal directions as guide. Zakaria is immune to plagiarism charges to date because he’s a member of a class: Acela DC-NY/shuttle and Davos, etc. Few of that set actually write their own speeches, PPT presentations or personal social media posts. Fewer of them respect those who write for them. Seemingly, it comes down to optics – at what point does sharing a Green Room or elevator in the Ritz become awkward.
Alex says
And a big C’MON MAN to Cisco Systems. While all this has been going on, they’ve been kitting out Kazan with a pukka anti-Maidan mesh-WLAN surveillance network and combat information centre:
http://newsroom.cisco.com/release/1494050/Cisco-to-Support-Pilot-Project-Initiating-Deployment-of-Smart-and-Safe-Kazan-City-Solution?utm_medium=rss
And you complain that the Brits aren’t keen enough on sanctions!
DrLeoStrauss says
Couldn’t agree more. Some in Silicon Valley knowingly and actively undermine civic societies’ potential. We need more light.
As an aside, this long (in Russian) recent screed by Dugin confirms the analysis in the post above (by lamenting Putin’s actions in reverse).
https://vk.com/duginag?w=wall18631635_4072
And this item from liberal Novaya Gazeta raises inferences of oligarch house arrest tied to financing separatists in Ukraine against Kremlin wishes. Conjecture and not much more here, but interesting.
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/65499.html
Alex says
I can’t help but think this is optimistic. A couple of weeks ago, yes, but the situation on the ground has changed much for the worse and it looks like Russia gets to keep Donetsk. The imbricated, complex front is probably a plus from a Russian POV because they want to maintain instability, friction, and low-level conflict.
That said, you couldn’t be more right that Putin missed a huge trick in not stopping with Crimea. He could have taken that one to the bank as the guy who actually brought actual Soviet territory back, at practically no cost. He’s ended up by bringing about ethnogenesis in Ukraine, alienating everyone around the perimeter, pissing off NATO mightily, getting a bunch of economic problems, and acquiring a strip of partly devastated ground he’ll have to subsidise and defend, while both the Moscow pro-European and the far-right constituencies are mad at him.
Interesting cultural point: what make you of Karl Rove and cocktail review plagiarist Fareed Zakaria both naming projects after GPS? Obvious nostalgia both for Reagan (really Carter)-era Big Five procurement origins of NAVSTAR and optimistic Clinton era of its arrival among civilians, but also surely speaking to a need for orientation and direction among their audiences, but also an unwillingness to reflect more deeply. It’s a global Positioning system, after all.