Russia launches another major offensive in Donbass. Its operational scale and intensity already approaches peak Russian tempo from August/September. We warned official and unofficial Washington variously in November and December 2014 this attack would come – despite the professed optimism of a ‘soft landing’ with Putin based on the so-called Minsk Accords.
A favorite response? “Russians don’t typically like winter operations” – or something like that. What can one say? Ray Garthoff’s generation of Soviet analysts is long gone. It’s a Buzzfeed world now, we just live in it.
Russia telegraphed her intent in several ways. Throughout the Fall Russia pushed Ukrainians back from agreed upon start lines incrementally. By January Russia captured over 200 square miles. Simultaneously, substantial Russian military and logistical support poured into Donbass. It’s important to note a key Russian military lesson from 2014 – the expenditure of ammunition and other support in Ukraine vastly exceeded their expectations.
Finally, Russian military and a significant number of special forces battered Ukrainian troops defending the Donetsk airport in late January. The so-called Ukrainian “cyborg” heroes repulsed Russians for over 200 days. Russia’s TV Channel One underscored the importance of the January airport assault showing Russian naval infantry fighting there on national TV (see update). The Ukrainians held out until overwhelmed by Russian troops who, according to OCSE reports, also may have used gas.
Germany once again tried to paper over Russian aggression with a new agreement. The next day Russia launched multi-pronged offensives across Donbass, far beyond boundaries of September’s Minsk agreement.
What to make of it all? Here are five key points with thoughts on arming Ukraine to follow.
One: Russia exposes again American illusions that a consensus reality ‘soft landing’ bargain is currently possible.
Two: Putin seeks more than just re-negotiating the Minsk Accords or chastising Merkel. Russia’s long term goal remains Ukraine’s subordination to Moscow in toto. Putin improvises within that framework. Russian security state thinking in Putin’s war cabinet rejects the idea of a neutral Ukraine because it has the *potential* to be pro-Western and lead regime change in Moscow. From 2004-2014 they consistently repeat this point. As long as they and Putin are in power, a ‘frozen conflict’ is acceptable as a strategic pause; the Minsk Accords are a practical nullity.
Three: Russian domestic politics drive most of Russian foreign policy, as with the Soviets, too. Putin’s power is based on personal popularity derived from plebiscitary radicalization. Putin has stated repeatedly his entire 2014-2015 acting out is about escaping from the perceived yoke of the international community and its alleged EU/American values. Those values of process and procedure are antithetical to his mobilization regime: the essence of Russian revanchism. This internal dynamic is separate from Ukraine itself and uses a Ukrainian crisis as a prop.
Four: Putin is indifferent how he accomplishes Ukraine’s subordination or manipulates Russian domestic emotionalism. He will mix and match military, paramilitary, terrorism, bribery and feigned cooperation; all are tactical, improvised guises to use or discard per the exigencies of a moment. His improvisation remains the constant. It is a profound mistake to confuse the guise for the purpose.
Five: There is no example in modern recorded history of a revanchist regime being successfully deterred into reform. (1947’s Soviet Union wasn’t revanchist). This is true from Italy, Germany, Japan if you count the militarists’ 1920s attack on democracy (which we do), various governments in Eastern Europe, and even France’s de Gaulle. History teaches that revanchist regimes stop when their options for improvisation are denied, almost always and unfortunately, kinetically.
The military situation in Ukraine is grave. Evidence to date, however, does not indicate the Russians are conducting large scale operations in strategic depth to threaten Ukraine’s integrity. The main operational purpose so far is as much psychological as to achieve specific local political-military objectives – as with the Russians seizing the Donetsk airport.
The Russian offensive renews American calls to arm Ukraine. The main problem facing Ukraine is more difficult than mere arms – it’s people. First, while Ukraine uses the word “war” often, in truth they’ve wisely refused the bait to actually declare it. IMF assistance and other crucial Ukrainian international relationships can be affected technically by such declarations. Second, there’s more that Ukraine can do. Various mobilizations have come and gone with minimal effectiveness. Poroshenko’s promise to raise the defense budget to 3% GDP is feasible but remains just that.
Execution is the key. Ukrainians themselves acknowledge Kiev’s military culture, training and doctrine are inappropriate for a modern war, declared or not. Specific command level personalities may not be suited for responsibilities. Kiev tolerates too much rivalry and factionalism in military matters. Ukrainian command dysfunction deeply exacerbated the Ilovaisk tragedy. Similarly, Ukraine’s military failed to support the Donetsk ‘cyborgs’ due to poor planning and operations, not lack of weapons.
We support improving Ukraine’s defensive capabilities. After all, the best deterrent to Putin’s improvisation is to send back “Cargo 200” (Russian KIA). American training assistance and advice on military reform is key. In the past, simple items like body armor, fuel or night vision goggles were blocked because they were deemed “force multipliers”, i.e. too aggressive.
Identifying the best arms to fit Ukraine’s current state of doctrine, training, and C3I is not easy. Choices should be carefully considered.
For example, tactical kinetics are more problematic than some realize. The rate of ammunition expenditure in Donbass and engagement intensity with regular Russian forces (65% of Ukrainian armor was lost in August/Sept.) are extraordinary. Kinetics are useful only with substantial logistical flows not only *to* Ukraine but *within* Ukraine to the front. Ukraine already struggles to supply troops with arms made in Ukraine by Ukrainians. Adding new foreign systems (and spares) to that sagging logistical/depot system without crucial familiarity and training is a recipe for – at best – disappointment. Finding and supplying (improved) Russian-made weapons familiar to Ukrainian logistics and fighters is a more effective answer.
Helping Kiev with comms/C4ISR is more straightforward. Some is being done now. C4ISR cooperation must be careful; Russian penetration of Kiev’s military and security services remains a problem. COTS should not be dismissed, either.
An uparmed Ukraine without corresponding changes in doctrine, training and personnel still would be overmatched by Russian professionals. The resulting Russian propaganda victory would be immense. Changes require time. As the improved training, C3 and doctrinal reform take place, Ukraine’s military efficiency will increase, as well as her capacity to absorb different classes of weapons. Assisting Ukraine the smart way will help Kiev deter Russian proxies in the near term and ultimately make Russia pay a full price for further adventurism.
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UPDATE: The Russian soldier shown on Russia Channel One television wearing naval marine insignia now claims he was a volunteer. Details of his story are here.
Dr Leo Strauss says
False equivalence between Putin and the U.S. is ahistorical and usually inflates his importance.
Here, Moscow’s subversion campaign in Ukraine is unrelated to American foreign policy mistakes. Russia first tried to suborn President Kuchma to subordinate Kiev to Moscow. Kuchma proved surprisingly (to Moscow) resistant to pressure and corruption.
Modern Russian security and domestic revanchism began with the Kremlin’s failure to elect Yanukovich in open 2004 elections. Moscow’s loss in Kiev started the Russian turn to radicalization from 2005, Munich to the present. Because Moscow ran Yanukovich in 2004 as a special operation, Russians (falsely) believed they were beaten by another (non-existent) special operation.
Libya and other later, real American missteps merely confirmed that false, pre-existing, wholly notional, emotionally volcanic Russian narrative of grievance. American general indifference to Russia (and Ukraine especially until January 2014) exacerbated matters and a geopolitical mistake. (The EU’s Partnership provocative bungling discussed elsewhere here at length).
Putin now needs anti-Americanism and anti-Maidan for regime survival. Beyond sanctions, the regime must divert attention from Russian chronic/perpetual failure to modernize. A modernizing Ukraine following Poland, Estonia and others in reform’s prosperity is far more lethal to Russia and Putinism than any fantasy conspiracy.
In reliance on primitive mixture of nihilism and anti-modern self-pity, Putin’s Russia and ISIS are not that far apart.
Therion says
Lol I’m reading Strauss’s windy list of nostrums for Russia along with his catalog of Russian deficits and I’m thinking of the nightmare that is America with its endemic racism – TOTALLY corrupt judiciary with what, a 90% conviction rate – its prison gulag with its max concentration facilities and isolation tanks – its gun madness – its fat cat profiteers and venal rip-off capitalism – its sociopathic shooters and racist militarized cops…. the list goes on… and I seriously want to tell this poser to go take a hike… and I haven’t even started on the long history of American imperialist war and atrocity.
If anything is a primitive mixture of all kinds of redundancy and lunacy it is the United States of America.
davidly says
Of course the points made about metonymic Moscow and Russia apply to Washington and the United States, procedural American values notwithstanding (when the process involves a more sophisticated ability to covertly affect regime change, Putin’s approach is going to appear more hostile). Everyone has her interests at stake and “Berlin” is clearly acting in hers, which is between a rock and hard place.
sglover says
I forgot to mention… I recently ran across the “Irrussianality” blog:
https://irrussianality.wordpress.com/
You might already be aware of it. If not, you might enjoy it. It’s from a Canadian academic. To my mind, he’s got a sane perspective on the situation with Russia: He’s sober about western options, without the Putin apologetics that I see appearing too often.
Dr Leo Strauss says
You’re right. Ukraine ‘wins’ by focusing on real lustration, meaningful anti-corruption and transparent political/economic reform. Exchanging oligarchical factions (the original set, then Yanukovich’s family/PoR, marginalizing Akhmetov with a weakened Firtash and empowered Kolomoyskyi) – without more – is largely a deck chair swap. That new system would represent a fraction of the hopes expressed during Maidan’s course.
Ukrainian reforms threaten Putinism and Russian self-esteem. Moscow will wage covert and overt war with Russian regular military for Ukraine in toto until Kiev abandons reforms and returns to past corrupt subordination. That’s Ukraine’s Gordian knot.
“Arming Ukraine” is a slogan without meaning absent context. This post asserts the first and most effective step in helping Ukrainian defense is General Staff, MoD, C&C, logistics and corruption reform. (Ukrainian traitors on Moscow’s payroll another factor). State control over ad hoc formations – both in authority and responsibility for supply/compensation- is critical. Kolomoyskyi turned the formations he raised after April 2014 over to formal MoD control/chain of command. More can be done; this will take time. A pallet of Javelins on a tarmac won’t change more than a tactical engagement without these additional, long term steps.
Moscow faces constraints, too. Russia’s only belatedly successful attack on Debaltseve underscores Moscow’s bluff and psychological warfare. The Russian Army is actually fairly weak and lacks the size and means to mount the major offensives Putin routinely threatens, let alone hold any ground taken. (The relatively small, effective operational order of battle and force density for occupation, respectively – Russia simply can’t take and hold Ukraine except in incremental bites ala Minsk). And Russia is extremely casualty adverse. For that reason, like in Chechnya II, Russians prefer to remain in command and control and inject shock troops, feeding locals, Russian convicts and other “trash” as meat grinders. A reformed Ukrainian military, eventually uparmed and with some mobilization reserve in depth would be more than a deterrent for Putin’s current and projected light, glass jaw military.
Debaltseve held out for over two weeks defying the Russians without competent command and control, supplies, comms or practical weapons. The position, like 1943, an obvious pincer target. The Ukrainian Army stopped the Russian military, GRU and Alpha troops expecting a quick victory. Even accounting for Ukrainian boosterism, this account by Biriukov is generally accurate: Russians forced to resort to at least 6-1 odds give or take, and UA still withdrew denying Moscow the craved kotel victory. https://www.facebook.com/yuri.biriukov/posts/1564980133770798
Russian PR scrambled to feed panic mongers in the West to frame Debaltseve as another Ilovaisk. It’s actually an indictment on Russian military prowess that it took so long and so much effort. And a sign for what a future Ukrainian military might accomplish. The next phase of Russian military operations will be correspondingly more de-modernized and brutal.
Poroshenko gets your point that Ukraine ‘wins’ by leaving the war (and Russia) behind. Others – Yatsenyuk, Parubyi et al. perhaps less so. Poroshenko must do the almost impossible, pursue systemic reform and prepare for war. And Moscow gets a vote, too.
sglover says
Thanks for the reply! Sorry, another long rant follows.
I understand that you’re acquainted with some of the Beltway Caesars, and that you know things that I don’t. I think you’ll recall that I’ve been to various cities in Ukraine, know people there, and have some acquaintance with its recent and not so recent history. (Though in no sense am I an expert.) Today I spoke to my friend from Korosten, pro-Maidan when Maidan was still in business. All the news there is bad, with omens of worse coming… Anyway, from my perspective, there are no profanities foul enough to describe these Washington clowns blithely talking about arming Ukraine.
There is no conceivable circumstance where any arms Ukraine gets will be enough to contain a really determined push by the separatists/Russians. More important, there is no conceivable circumstance where any arms Ukraine gets will suffice to “roll back” the separatists, and “liberate” the rubble of Donbas. The first scenario is a Beltway warrior marketing ploy, and thus not worth more than a scoff. The second seems to motivate Poroshenko. (Or whoever is in charge in Kiev — if anyone really **is** in charge there. Kiev doesn’t seem to be doing a really great job of provisioning and leading its own army, which is tacitly or openly acknowledged by the Ukrainians running donation services for their troops.) As I understand it, the pocket in Debaltsevo is intended to make an autonomous Donbas untenable.
In immediate, practical terms, Poroshenko ought to forget about the Debaltsevo “salient”, work out a withdrawal of the troops stuck in it, and accept the new boundaries after it’s been sealed up. Apparently the new ceasefile glossed over that situation — more evidence of a slipshod deal.
Anyway, along with the economic crisis with which it is now intertwined, THE WAR INTSELF is the source of so much of the suffering that Ukrainians are enduring. If the fighting continues, that will only continue AND WORSEN. I believe it will worsen out of all proportion to what we’ve already seen. (Again, NONE of this will be endured by Beltway chickenhawks. Again, English lacks obscenities adequate for describing them.) That fighting will accomplish **nothing** that any sane person would recognize as beneficial. For good or ill, the separatists have achieved a kind of autonomy. People there might come to to rue it, or they might not. It seems unlikely that any sort of federalism arrangement will be acceptable to all sides.
So the fighting must end. Period. Whatever cocktail of arms our Beltway geniuses are proposing, it can only add fuel to the fire.
How so? If the lines will remain relatively static, what’s the harm in some anti-tank weapons, and similar defensive arms? And here the real question is, who’s ultimately going to get the weapons, and the training that goes with it? I think it’s inevitable: “Efficiency” and “effectiveness” (read: expedience) will land those weapons in the laps of the militias. Our DC chickenhawks can yammer on — with a straight face! — about how the elusive “moderate Syrian rebel” or “motivated Iraqi soldier” can pull off whatever the hell we think we’re trying to do in the Levant. They’ll have no trouble at all puffing up the militias as our newest, bestest proxies.
The militias have the advantage of actually existing, and apparently they have been effective in a strictly tactical sense. But look a little deeper, and it’s really hard to imagine them as anything but a cancer in an already weakened social tissue. Let’s grant they’re not all like the Azov (“It’s just an amazing coincidence that our logo looks like a Waffen SS divisional insignia! Honest!”) battalion. Let’s also assume that they’re not all havens for freebooters who eventually come to consider fighting an end in itself. In short, lets ignore pretty much all recent experience that America’s had with its proxy armies.
Exclude these (very real) problems, and you’re left with this: As far as I can tell, many (most? all?) of the militias are the patronage projects of oligarchs. Can you imagine anything that Ukraine needs LESS?!?! Hell, under Yanukovuch they just had oligarchs. Now, for all practical purposes, our think tank geniuses want to bless Ukraine with oligarchs AND condotierri.
Of course, they’ll deny it. Actually, that’s probably not true, because I see no evidence that they’ve even thought that far ahead. It’s after the pathologies appear that the blame-shifting will begin. Actually, that’s probably not true either, because it’ll likely all fall down the memory hole, and by then our “strategists” will be dreaming up schemes to fuck up some other part of the world.
Anyway… About Twitter I don’t have an opinion. Your feed and the invaluable “Florida Man” are the only ones I’ve ever followed. It’s probably a sign of encroaching geezerdom, but I’ve never really seen much utility in all the fads that fall under “social media”. MeetUp seems somewhat useful, but my experience is that of the interest groups that I attend most regularly, all of them came to my attention through a conventional web site, or a flyer.
sglover says
It’s getting difficult to place much faith in the new Minsk agreement. What I’d first heard as “federalism” for Donbas/Trandniestra 2 — a healthy recognition of current reality — looks more like an arrangement in which Kiev can shell out funds that it doesn’t have to pensioners stuck behind the buffer zone.
And that buffer zone, or some demilitarized zone, would look a helluva lot more convincing if there were, say, a few battalions of EU troops running peacekeeping patrols along its length. I’d love to hope that something like that is at least being considered, but experience suggests that Brussels is going to seize the opportunity to remain obtuse and feckless.
Meanwhile the gryvnia’s worth about a third of what it was a year ago. I appreciated your Twitter remark about Germany squaring the circle of largesse for Ukraine with austerity for the EU. That seems a little shaky. But on a marginally related note, do you see your Twitter feed as a way to relay opinion, or to relay opinion that you endorse? Because — McFaul?!?! Strobe Talbott? McFaul was a joke as an ambassador, and I’m not even sure if Talbott is a real person. He’s always seemed like a Disney animatronic version of A Very Serious Person. But without the imagination and spontaneity of most cyborgs.
Dr Leo Strauss says
Good points. Minsk 2 is inherently unworkable. Beyond concessions forced upon Ukraine directly tied to Russian tactical/quasi-operational military objectives — such as closing the pocket or keeping the border open.
Great point re cost shifting. Poroshenko’s earlier declaration limiting expenditures hit Moscow hard.
The EU is simply the EU. France and Germany historically have difficulty seeing Ukraine as fully realized independent nation. No EU solider will be put in harm’s way for Ukraine, and likely not even for the EU. There, Putin et al. see Europe more clearly than 99.99% of Americans. (NATO qua NATO one hopes is different).
Americans have two separate tasks: alliance management and alliance leadership. This WH understands one clearly. Many reasons Putin might believe he holds the winning hand, playing the player, not the cards.
(For new readers a gentle reminder this entire site is dedicated to rational empiricism, contra impulsive and often ruinous bellicosity).
The Twitter account shares ideas, pro or con, for comment. And supports worthy ideas. A stray pop culture item might appear.
Originally the feed shared many Russian language articles. A small discourtesy – some followers interested in Russia don’t speak or read Russian.
Twitter sometimes fosters a tribalism and transient emotion. Do you have a more optimistic view?
Came across Michael McFaul’s work in early 1990s with his pioneering efforts on privatization in Saratov. He was with Stanford. His projects paralleled ours on the general subject. The Moscow posting planted seeds for the future.
Strobe Talbott definitely exists! And gracious in interactions. Building on his Khrushchev work, his covering the Perle/Burt battle over the GLCMs and Pershings supplements his tenure at Foggy Bottom and after.
Re arming Ukraine, the Talbott et al. group report (Report) most welcome. The view here isn’t 100% theirs but that’s to be expected. This post, for example, didn’t explore UA’s economic realities (which you note) in deserved detail.
The Report raised issues for the public and the tight circle making actual policy. Importantly, Ukraine is represented with agency, rather than just the object of imperial ambitions.
Overall, our bench of Russian and Ukrainian expertise could be deeper. Investing in people takes time. We should start with new students and professionals now.
During the Cold War we had some excellent Soviet analysts in and out of government who maybe really couldn’t read, speak or write Russian at today’s expected levels, relying instead on FBIS (Paul Goble is a kind of ‘human’ version of FBIS today with his site).
Now, we have many with terrific Russian language skills comparatively. Russia hasn’t been a closed country for 24 years. The difference between advocacy skills and formal analysis, however, may not come immediately to mind.
Humor from Heaven? Perhaps.