More than most years, 2014 will be retrospectively consequential. The US post-1945 order finally enters its transition era. Most obviously, Putin launched an ill-conceived war to challenge its foundations. Other developments promise significant portent. Modi’s rise in India is but one example. Domestically, Americans’ facade of a post-racial society collapsed. And Neocons re-emerged.
Americans remain lucky internationally for now. Russia’s war began with clumsy improvisation and lurched to a strategic dead end. Ukrainian grit surprised Moscow – just one of many Russian strategic intelligence failures. China, India and others support Moscow symbolically in part yet preserve their own options and interests in the present order. They follow their own timetable for systemic change, not Putin’s.
America avoided directly engaging Russia, denying Moscow the co-equal status it craves. That US stance encouraged Merkel and the EU to confront Russian aggression themselves. Russian hawks in power (and outside, like Sergei Markov) concede their hopes to split the alliance (to date) are unrealistic. One would like to think a coherent US strategy helped shape these events. Equally plausible is American tactical improvisation simply was more fortunate.
Putin? We’d rate him 2014’s net loser. Had he stopped at Crimea, he faced no sanctions and enjoyed stratospheric domestic approval. Russia is far weaker, more isolated, and domestically more fragile than during the Sochi boondoggle. From canceling Russia’s pet Southstream pipeline into Europe, ruble woes – Russian Central Bank Chief Elvira Nabuillina may have the toughest job in Russia today – to a bad gas deal with China and Putin’s isolation at the G20, Russian horizons shrunk a great deal.
Ukraine, conversely, is far more unified and committed to a European liberal path than ever. Two successful elections and a newly vibrant society show potential. Russia’s war in the Donbass forged a new nationalism and but sidelined a region (along with Crimea) that would’ve sent significant votes for Communists and pro-Moscow parties in Kiev.
Ukraine’s struggles are still beginning. IMF-driven reforms will pack a dislocating wallop. Kiev’s economy will remain on edge for some time. And vital domestic initiatives such as lustration and anti-corruption are still embryonic.
Merkel’s clear stance against Russian revisionism surprised Moscow. Many predicted she would follow German SPD party’s equivocation and German industrialists’ demands for “understanding”. Her marathon 6 hour November conversation with Putin in Australia may mark a watershed. Merkel now directly confronts Russian subversion in the Balkans. It’s a new German EU foreign policy leadership role. Will it work? Does she have the vision to sustain it? Can she maintain German domestic support?
2015 may be another story. EU sanctions expire soon if not renewed. Some US European experts are certain sanctions will be lifted. Moscow re-packages itself as a peace maker yet again to empower EU apologists. Putin hedges bets by advising Moscow technocrats to prepare for ten years of confrontation.
Neocons took 2014 by storm. 2015 can only offer more blue sky.
2014 marked the year Democrats en masse scrambled to join. Yet Democrats can’t articulate an alternative to Obama’s foreign policy that meaningfully differs from the Neocon critique. The Right and Rand Paul’s conversion to internationalist Realism (while Paul remains instinctually an isolationist) remain the exception. Interestingly, Fred Kagan and others openly declare their true home is in the Democratic Party (again).
The Neocons’ greatest 2014 success is framing ISIS as an existential threat. A tentative and reactive Obama Administration jumped on to ill-advised, ill-considered spastic kinetic force without a clear strategy.
The New Republic‘s demise is a different story. The larger and more important indictment? TNR long ago ceased to be an authentic, liberal, progressive voice.
Should TNR be a new Upworthy or Buzzfeed for a certain social set, perhaps it’s a fitting epitaph. The staff’s reaction to young owner Chris Hughes’ decisions reveals a mindset accustomed to benefactor patronage. To discover they’re employees like much of America is a harsh lesson.
America’s long vacation from social realities crashed on a global stage. Ferguson, Eric Garner in NY, Tamir Rice (the 12 year old boy shot by police because he had a bee bee gun) and so many others highlight the cost in lives and potential lost. American social dysfunction can’t be obscured. And it’s more than de-legitimized, excessively militarized local law enforcement.
The US for the first time nationally experienced how social technologies fueled protests from Tehran to Tunisia, Hong Kong to Maidan. Many Americans didn’t like uncensored voices. Protestors (from varied backgrounds) self organize, distribute video and photos, and use Livestream for alternative broadcasts to cable “news” coverage. (That America in 2014 lacks an actual cable news channel at all is merely symptomatic).
Racial inequality is the most prominent aspect of American disinterest in forging a healthy, inclusive society. Socio-economic stratification continues to widen. Congress’ roll back of its own weak 2008 Wall Street reforms — at the request of Wall Street — underscores the fault lines only grow. Dysfunctional government that responds only to the few doesn’t happen by accident. Nor is it sustainable.
Richard Haas observed that Foreign Policy Begins At Home. Our effectiveness abroad is directly linked to good governance at home. The link above deliberately is to the Daily Show. American youth (or young at heart), unfettered by old wedge issues on race, gender and class, can make a powerful difference – if they choose to engage politically.
These are the year’s highlights (or low points) to us. What did we miss? Who or what do you think made 2014?
rkka says
“Yanukovich’s decision to flee was a disaster for all except his money managers. You’re right about his political non-viability.
His continued presidency with early May elections would have allowed Crimea, Donbass, Kharkov, etc. to vote: all leaning to Party of Regions and the Communists, and still Maidan skeptics. There was no coup, but Yankovich’s abdication.”
Please. After Banderastanis had siezed the armament of several police and MVD arsenals in western Ukraine, all bets were off, as the NYT has recently shown:
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/04/world/europe/ukraine-leader-was-defeated-even-before-he-was-ousted.html?_r=0
It was a coup, and Yanukovych was a dead man if he had stayed.
It’s funny how when Banderastanis sieze weapons in protest against a legally and democratically elected president they get power, with the approval of the Anglosphere Foreign Policy Elite & Punditocracy (AFPE&P), and AFPE&P tame media are outraged at the use of riot police against armed Banderastanis, while Eastern Ukrainians who do the much less get their cities bombed with massed cannon, rocket, and aerial fires, again with the approval of the AFPE&P.
Of course, the AFPE&P have a loooooong record of backing the Banderastanis.
So again, if Yanukovych had stayed in Kiev, he wouldn’t have survived to hold any ‘early elections’ in May.
And it was not Putin who chose war in Ukraine, it was the Banderastanis and their backers among the AFPE&P.
DrLeoStrauss says
Let’s start at the beginning. With the 2004 elections. As you know, Yanukovich ran for president with Russian advisors, whose presence and assistance were widely known.
Yanukovich’s 2004 campaign created the artificial myth of ‘fascists’ and ‘Banderites’ threatening to take over Ukraine. The actual, individual so-called ‘fascists’ were on Yanukovich’s payroll, along with Kuchma’s and the SBU’s. To serve as provocateurs. Some even stood as spoiler candidates.
Some of these 2004 people would re-appear as ‘fascist bogeyman’ in the Party of Region’s campaigns in 2006 and 2010 before showing up again on Maidan as the new “Right Sector.” (Many others besides Yanukovich used these new constructs as well, and the Fatherland Party, too. Various oligarchs with differing agendas put them on payroll from 2004-2010 along with PoR).
Second, after losing in 2004, Yanukovich’s PoR in 2006 and 2010 created the ‘suppression of Russian language speakers’ myth and bogeyman. Even with all of the above, Yanukovich only barely beat Tymoshenko in 2010 by having Yushchenko to proclaim Bandera a national hero at the last minute to polarize the electorate.
Almost everything that Moscow, Yanukovich and Stephen Cohen proclaim as narrative and threat in Ukraine re 2014 is a Russian created artificial construct. Anti-Yanukovich personas unfortunately fell for the bait and proposed making Ukrainian the sole official language in the heated aftermath of Maidan’s slaughter. Wiser heads rejected the idea but the propaganda gift to Moscow already given.
Ukraine has a small, authentic ultra rightist element, too. As two elections have shown clearly, their support base is about 2.5% of Ukrainians. Marine Le Pen’s party in France polls at 25%, and Putin’s molting fascism has allegedly 80% Russian approval.
Yanukovich’s fleeing, according to the NYT timeline, had less to do with a small cache distant from Kiev and more to do with his suitcase packing schedule. He was in little personal danger. Even captured Berkut and MVD assault troops were released by protestors unharmed.
Bandera is a complicated historical figure for Ukrainians, let alone the Soviets, Poles and Germans he fought against. That historical conversation, however, is a manufactured smokescreen and distraction re today’s Ukraine.
It’s small comfort now, but in the not too distant future, Ukrainians perhaps may celebrate Putin as one of the fathers of a new Ukraine.
Comments says
What comes next?
Dr Leo Strauss says
As we predicted back in December to senior US officials, the Russians escalated with direct Russian military assaults in Ukraine under cover of posturing about Minsk. Even Channel One in Russia now shows Russian naval infantry in full uniform and insignia in combat at Donetsk airport. Dead Russian generals fall to the ground in Donbass.
It gives little pleasure to say that “we told you so.”
The reasons are many why Putin will be forced to continue escalation by internal political logic and vaguely formed ideology. Subject for a more considered analytical piece to come.
rkka says
“Yanukovich’s decision to flee ignited much of 2014’s sorrow.”
Yeah, 2014 would have been so much better if Yanukovych had stuck around to get a knife up the the ass, like Qadaffi got, to delight of the AFPE&P. You really believe that? Seriously?
“Many mistakes made in Brussels, Kiev and Moscow. ”
And none in Washington. Yeah, there was no Nuland or McCain on the Maidan, criticizing the use of riot police against Western Ukrainians there while encouraging the use of artillery on Eastern Ukrainians.
“Here we disagree on the immediate proximate cause: Putin’s insistence that Yanukovich must choose between Moscow aid and signing the EU agreement in Vilnius he had long promised the Ukrainian people.”
You misspelled “Barroso” above.
” Turkey, for example, signed association documents in the 1960s and is not a EU member yet. Merkel offered Putin a similar trajectory for Ukraine and underscored no NATO in February. ”
Before the coup that put Nuland’s darling “Yats” in charge…
“Putin chose war – mostly for emotional, psychological, personal reasons. ”
For a quarter of a century, USG policy has been to give Russia’s word the weight of zero in Euro security matters. Raymond Smith describes it as “…figurative but not substantive involvement in Western institutions…”And you know, when a major power’s word counts for nothing for a quarter of a century, they tend to find other means for continuing their political intercourse.
DrLeoStrauss says
You’re right. The EU made mistakes. The US, too, although of a different kind. We disagree that those not atypical mistakes justify Russia’s choice to start a war of aggression or embrace subrational revanchism.
We’ve discussed before that the EU apparat’s hubris mistakenly tempted Kiev with negotiations without meaningful aid. Or the focused support of member states. Moreover, Yanukovich never understood the agreement or his domestic finances.
Putin’s hardball offer of $15 billion in cash and energy discounts – if Yanukovich walked away from the EU completely – was within international parameters. It was, however, a strategic mistake.
Russia’s best choice was to accept the German February 2014 offer: (1) Ukraine signs the Association Agreement; (2) future negotiations evolve over considerable time; (3) Ukraine remain neutral, a bridge belonging to the Eurasian Union with embryonic EU ties. Without NATO.
That’s an outcome Moscow would jump at today. Putin’s zero sum thinking forced Yanukovich into a domestic crisis which he manifestly could not handle.
Recall Maidan began with students requesting Yanukovich sign the agreement as promised. It escalated in stages in response to repression, first with parents and Afghan vets joining their children, then to a broad anti-Yanukovich movement that attracted fringe elements (beyond just Ultra Rightists).
Maidan surprised all – Kiev, Moscow and Brussels. How did Russian intelligence fail to report the consequences of Yanukovich’s weak domestic position should he refuse the Vilnius agreement? Russian intelligence historically is operationally effective but less so with strategic assessments. If reports were made, Putin’s inner decision-making circle discarded them.
Maidan as a political symbol represented an existential threat to Putinism. As much as a modernizing Ukraine eventually following Poland’s model would do, at least in the short term.
Arguably the US decision post 2008 to allow the EU to lead on Ukraine policy in retrospect might be reconsidered. The rationale at the time made sense given the “re-set”. Could an early stage US role uncover Moscow’s tectonic issues that erupted so abruptly in 2014 at a more manageable level? It’s pure speculation.
Regarding events after Vilnius, McCain and Nuland are largely canards. US policy remained measured and carefully attuned to alliance management, contra McCain et al.’s wishes. Igor Jurgens, a former Russian policy advisor, called the Western response to date “homeopathic”.
Yanukovich’s decision to flee was a disaster for all except his money managers. You’re right about his political non-viability.
His continued presidency with early May elections would have allowed Crimea, Donbass, Kharkov, etc. to vote: all leaning to Party of Regions and the Communists, and still Maidan skeptics. There was no coup, but Yankovich’s abdication. Moscow was unwise to force Yanukovich into these circumstances.
Putin worst gamble (after Crimea)? Expecting his three (according to Girkin) FSB/GRU teams to manufacture a spontaneous pro-Russian uprising across the entire East to the Dnieper (to start). As we’ve described before, they all failed.
Even the Party of Regions refused Moscow’s ploy. In the Donbass, Russia could only turn out 3,000 demonstrators in Luhansk after paying them. Eventually, Russian fascist activists from National Unity, Orthodox offshoots, mercenaries, a faux Vostok Battalion of Chechens and Ossetians began losing to an ad hoc Ukrainian ATO.
Only overt Russian military intervention clawed back a small foothold in Donbass. The Ukrainians sent back far more Cargo 200 than Russians expected and the new brigades frankly did not perform all that well given the circumstances. Donetsk airport still stands despite 7 months of Russian efforts to take it. Moscow gave Ukraine their own Pavlov’s house.
Putin created a wholly new Ukrainian nationalism and unity. They will need it. Evidence to date indicates that Putin uses tactical pauses to assess further improvised escalation.
On your last point, Russians have (had) plenty of institutional voices with Europe from PACE to OCSE to the NATO-Russia Council, etc. What Moscow wants is a veto, not a voice. She demands a neo-Soviet role based on a $2 trillion economy the size of Spain’s (as of this writing).
Putin’s America fixation, demanding parity of influence (in all spheres) with a $16 trillion economy exposes the underlying emotional core issues: grievance, nostalgia and wounded self-image. Putin did not create the latent revanchism in Russian society, although he poured gasoline on simmering embers.
Putin does not seek input into the international community. He demands freedom from it and its norms, while enjoying selectively – and parasitically – its benefits. It’s a form of inchoate nihilism masked by vague historical fantasies and an underlying mysticism.
Tragically, Sochi (for all its problems) represented the path not taken. A confident, open Russia engaging with the world successfully.
DrLeoStrauss says
Yanukovich’s decision to flee ignited much of 2014’s sorrow. Many mistakes made in Brussels, Kiev and Moscow.
Here we disagree on the immediate proximate cause: Putin’s insistence that Yanukovich must choose between Moscow aid and signing the EU agreement in Vilnius he had long promised the Ukrainian people. Moscow should have allowed the signing to occur, and court Ukraine with the real tangible aid offered, while the EU offered just more documents.
The Association Agreement really meant little in the long run if Russia was patient. Turkey, for example, signed association documents in the 1960s and is not a EU member yet. Merkel offered Putin a similar trajectory for Ukraine and underscored no NATO in February. In fact, without the crisis, it would take 8-10 years for Ukraine just to qualify for EU membership with years to go after that.
Putin chose war – mostly for emotional, psychological, personal reasons. Shared by an incredibly small and insular decision-making circle. NATO really is a canard.
Neocons do savor Russia as an ideological foe again. Putin’s Russia gives them so much ample reason. This entire crisis very much avoidable and tragic. Russia’s war not only objectively was unnecessary but she could have achieved her original strategic objectives without it.
Rkka says
Disagree on the Neocons greatest accomplishment.
It was overthowing the democratically-elected president of Ukraine, who had a year to go before the election he was going to lose.
But this way they get to have Russia as an explicit enemy again!